A systems engineering perspective on the human-centered design of health information systems  by Samaras, George M. & Horst, Richard L.
www.elsevier.com/locate/yjbin
Journal of Biomedical Informatics 38 (2005) 61–74A systems engineering perspective on the human-centered design
of health information systems
George M. Samarasa,*, Richard L. Horstb
a Samaras and Associates, Inc., 7755 Soda Creek Road, Pueblo, CO, USA
b UserWorks, Inc., Silver Spring, MD, USA
Received 5 November 2004
Available online 8 December 2004Abstract
The discipline of systems engineering, over the past ﬁve decades, has used a structured systematic approach to managing the ‘‘cra-
dle to grave’’ development of products and processes. While elements of this approach are typically used to guide the development of
information systems that instantiate a signiﬁcant user interface, it appears to be rare for the entire process to be implemented. In
fact, a number of authors have put forth development lifecycle models that are subsets of the classical systems engineering method,
but fail to include steps such as incremental hazard analysis and post-deployment corrective and preventative actions. In that most
health information systems have safety implications, we argue that the design and development of such systems would beneﬁt by
implementing this systems engineering approach in full. Particularly with regard to bringing a human-centered perspective to the
formulation of system requirements and the conﬁguration of eﬀective user interfaces, this classical systems engineering method pro-
vides an excellent framework for incorporating human factors (ergonomics) knowledge and integrating ergonomists in the interdis-
ciplinary development of health information systems.
 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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Health information systems are rapidly increasing in
variety, size, complexity, and sophistication. Depending
on ones deﬁnitions, health information systems can
range from those running on a standalone platform,
e.g., a medical device, to those involving world-wide net-
works, distributed databases, and enterprise-wide inter-
operability. Regardless, some common elements among
this vast range of systems are that they have human
safety implications and they have interfaces with human
users. The ‘‘users’’ of a given interface can be patients,
caregivers, or system operators, administrators, or
developers. Of course, most health information systems1532-0464/$ - see front matter  2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jbi.2004.11.013
* Corresponding author. Fax: +1 719 485 3819.
E-mail address: george@samaras-assoc.com (G.M. Samaras).have multiple such interfaces. Thus, there is much to be
said for a human-centered approach to the conceptuali-
zation, design, and development of such systems.
Human-centered research, design, development, test-
ing, and evaluation are the core activities of the ﬁeld of
human factors (or ergonomics) engineering—whose
mandate is to design products and processes for human
use. Individuals who are not trained in ergonomics can-
not be expected to anticipate all possible uses, misuses or
abuses of their products or processes [1]. Organizations
that do not insist on human factors engineering knowl-
edge having ‘‘an equal seat at the table’’ cannot reason-
ably expect to avoid potentially catastrophic,
unanticipated consequences in their products and pro-
cesses. The fundamental architecture for professional
competence in ergonomics is deﬁned by the Board of
Certiﬁcation of Professional Ergonomists [2], which is
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In the case of health information systems, where the role
of the various human stakeholders is crucial, it is hardly
surprising that the implementation of sophisticated tech-
nologies often fail due to the lack of structured, system-
atic consideration of human issues. While such failures
are sometimes attributed to ‘‘human error,’’ there is per-
suasive evidence [3–5] that the fault more often lies with
inadequate system design or shortfalls in the organiza-
tional structure within which these systems are utilized.
Such failures and ineﬃciencies can be avoided by the
thorough implementation of the methods, and over a
half a century of expertise, of the system engineering dis-
cipline. While elements of this approach are typically
used to guide the development of information systems
that instantiate a signiﬁcant user interface, it appears
to be rare for the entire process to be implemented.
In this regard, it is important to note that the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) details the application
of a systems engineering method (that we describe here
as ‘‘SE’’) for manufacturers of ﬁnished medical devices.
Speciﬁc guidance [6] clearly indicates the human factors
implications of the regulation. As health information
systems begin to have more profound eﬀects on individ-
ual patient care [4,7], the FDA may also begin to con-
sider them as medical devices (for example, blood
banking software systems are now considered medical
devices and subject to the FDA regulation).
In this article, we describe the classical SE method,
emphasizing that it provides a framework for incorpo-
rating ergonomics knowledge in all phases of the inter-
disciplinary development process and integrating the
role of ergonomists into the development team. We
compare and contrast the classical systems engineering
method to more recently published development lifecy-
cle methods, pointing out that the latter represent
incomplete subsets of the former. We cite two accidents
involving ‘‘user error’’ with health information systems
(radiological therapy systems where the errors resulted
in overexposures that were fatal to the patients) which
would have likely been avoided by a conscientious appli-
cation of hazard analyses. We discuss practical matters
that arise in the application of an SE approach and iden-
tify tools for implementing the various elements of the
SE method. Finally, we discuss some of the macroergo-
nomic issues involved in organizational change, so that
ergonomists may be involved, from cradle to grave, in
the development and deployment of products and
processes.2. Historical perspective
The term systems engineering dates back to the Bell
Telephone Laboratories in the 1940s [8]. One of the ear-
liest descriptions of the methodological framework forsystems engineering is a paper by Hall [9]. As Sage
[10] indicated ‘‘It is especially interesting to note that
his paper [i.e., Halls paper], despite its date, appears
to have suﬀered extraordinarily little from the passage
of time.’’ The USAF issued Mil-Std 499A (now obso-
lete) in 1974 [11]; it describes the systems engineering
process and its iterative nature [12]. Nadler [13] has ana-
lyzed the theoretical and philosophical issues surround-
ing systems methodology and design. System design for
human interaction, emphasizing system management
and methodological issues, has been an important issue
in systems engineering [14]. Chapanis [15] states that his
major thesis is ‘‘for a system to be successful, three lines
of development—the user, hardware, and software—
have to be managed and woven into an integrated prod-
uct throughout’’ the systems engineering process. Buede
[16] discusses the various equivalent development mod-
els (waterfall, spiral, Vee, and rapid prototyping), point-
ing out that Forsberg and Mooz have shown that ‘‘the
spiral activities can be mapped onto the Vee model with-
out swapping any activities in time.’’ The FDA has de-
tailed this systems engineering approach in its updated
Good Manufacturing Practices regulation [17]. Blan-
chard [18] emphasizes the cost impact of not using a rig-
orous, structured, systematic approach to system
development, and the iterative nature of safety engineer-
ing with its numerous interfaces to the system engineer-
ing process [19]. This is also emphasized by Kossiakoﬀ
and Sweet [20].3. Theory
The application of ergonomics should not operate
independently of product or process development and
should not be viewed as standing alone [21]. It is best
considered within a rigorously applied, structured, sys-
tematic development framework well-known to the sys-
tems engineering discipline. It is this framework that
permits taking maximal advantage of ergonomics
knowledge and expertise throughout the product or pro-
cess lifecycle. It is the incorporation of ergonomics
knowledge in this process, rather than the perceived
stature of any particular ergonomics professional, that
should engender trust in the endeavor.4. What is SE?
SE is a structured, systematic approach to system risk
reduction over the full lifetime of the system (from cradle
to grave). It is of particular importance in new product
development of complex systems. Your ability to predict
system behavior reliably increases with increasing levels
of validation. Un-validated systems have a high degree
of uncertainty (complexity) in their behavior; validation
thus decreases the complexity of system behavior.
Fig. 2. The SE lifecycle model.
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ing the likelihood of reducing errors and time to market.
It is a structured, risk-based, iterative approach to the
research, design, development, test and evaluation,
deployment, and salvage/disposal of products and pro-
cesses. It is a formal process that emphasizes transpar-
ency and clarity of known objectives and constraints.
4.1. The SE space
The SE domain is the triumvirate of requirements
engineering, compliance engineering, and reliability
engineering. The SE range includes activities from the
disciplines of hardware engineering, software engineer-
ing, ergonomics, and seller/purchaser economics; these
reﬂect the range of activities involved in development
of products and processes. The time line begins with
conceptualization and ends with salvage and disposal
(‘‘lust to dust’’). This space within which SE takes place
is depicted in Fig. 1. All SE activities can be character-
ized by their placement in this space, and conversely,
there is some SE activity that is pertinent to all points
in this space.
As a lifecycle process (see Fig. 2), it begins with the
initial conceptualization of the system, it is continually
applied throughout the research, design, development,
testing and evaluation (RDDT & E) phase, in the oper-
ational phase (with periodic re-validations), and ﬁnally,
when the system is obsolete, in the salvage and disposal
phase. The feedback loops of this lifecycle model (Fig. 2)
consist of validation testing (implementation vs. require-
ments), veriﬁcation testing (of requirements, speciﬁca-
tions, and implementation), incremental hazard
analyses (HA), and post-deployment corrective and pre-
ventative actions (CAPA). The feedforward loop con-
sists of needs assessment, translation of needs to
quantiﬁable requirements, translation of requirements
to quantitative engineering speciﬁcations, translation
of speciﬁcations to a product/process implementation,
and the deployment of the product or process.Fig. 1. Microergonomic SE space.Ergonomic considerations participate in a manner
similar to hardware, software, and economic consider-
ations in the development of requirements, in compli-
ance with appropriate regulations and standards, and
in the engineering of system reliability.
4.2. Requirements engineering
From a product development process perspective,
one can obtain a more detailed view of requirements
engineering. The ﬁrst step in the iterative process is iden-
tiﬁcation of the needs of the system users—which pre-
supposes that you have correctly identiﬁed the
universe of user populations (manufacturers, assem-
blers, operators, clinicians, patients, maintainers, dis-
posers, etc.) as shown in the Venn diagram of Fig. 3.
User needs assessment is a complex activity that often
has been implemented by marketing personnel with ad
hoc engineering support; in fact, it is a central area of
expertise and practice in ergonomics. Some examples
of needs assessment techniques include interviews, ques-Fig. 3. The user universe—the needs of typical target audiences
overlap.
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storming, problem-domain storyboarding, prototyping,
literature reviews, and ergonomics laboratory research,
as well as evolutionary (rapid and iterative) develop-
ment techniques. Both from a good business practices
perspective and from a FDA regulatory perspective,
they must be implemented in a statistically valid man-
ner, so that the results truly represent the populations
under study.
Once the user needs have been determined, the next
task is to translate the subset of needs, that will be
met, into requirements of the health information system.
This activity also requires the knowledge and skills of
ergonomics. Requirements are the foundation of the val-
idation process and a crucial source of the engineering
design speciﬁcations (Fig. 4). When dealing with health
information systems, particularly those in which pro-
prietary software or database content run on generic
hardware, the requirements and speciﬁcations may
encompass such issues as response time, storage capac-
ity, load balancing, data backup and disaster recovery,
system availability, and ease of use. It is helpful to treat
user interface characteristics in the same manner as these
system performance variables, setting usability objec-
tives for the system in measurable terms, typically
couched in terms of eﬀectiveness, eﬃciency, and user
satisfaction as identiﬁed in ISO 13407:1999 [22].
Defective requirements are the principal cause of
incorrect or inadequate system designs and failed valida-
tions. Common ﬂaws include not selecting the proper
target audiences and assuming you already know the
user needs. Properly formulated requirements are natu-
ral language statements (e.g., English) that are under-
standable by the user populations, by the design team,
and by seller and purchaser management. Properly for-
mulated requirements must be traceable to speciﬁc user
needs, must be clear, complete, and internally consistent,
and must be veriﬁable (you must be able to design a test
for it). In order for a requirement to be quantiﬁable and
testable—and thus veriﬁable—it is imperative that there
exist operational deﬁnitions of the critical elements
incorporated within each requirement. Absent opera-Fig. 4. Veriﬁcation versus validationtional deﬁnitions, there can be no measurements and
no veriﬁcation.
Proper requirement formulation is an inter-disciplin-
ary engineering activity that necessarily includes ergo-
nomics expertise to represent properly the discovered
needs of the various user populations. A central activity
of ergonomics is translating user needs into require-
ments (and then requirements into engineering speciﬁca-
tions). If this is reminiscent of ‘‘concurrent engineering’’
discussions, it is because it is the same discussion [23,24].
Just as electronics engineers must make sure the
mechanical engineers leave enough room for their
printed circuit boards, and the software engineers make
sure the electronics engineers put enough memory in the
circuitry for their code, and the manufacturing engineers
make sure standard parts are not replaced (without
good justiﬁcation) with custom parts, so ergonomists
make sure the design team meets the users actual needs.
And, when diﬃcult engineering trade-oﬀs are encoun-
tered, the ergonomists on the design team must ensure
that the users needs are properly considered—because
if they are not met, either the product will fail, will pro-
duce unreliable results, will encourage new competition
in the market, or worse, will harm patients!
Once the requirements are properly established and
veriﬁed against the user needs, the next task is to trans-
late these natural language statements into engineering
design speciﬁcations. Engineering design speciﬁcations
are the true basis for the product design and are quanti-
tative product attributes with associated units and toler-
ances. Once again, the ergonomist can play a crucial role
on the design team, directly impacting the work of the
rest of the team and the ﬁnal design of the product:
1. From a hardware ergonomics perspective, the ergono-
mist not only has access to tabulated human cognitive
and perceptual data, and as appropriate, anthropo-
metric data, which can dictate physical speciﬁcations,
but the ergonomist is trained to properly use these
data in the realization of engineering designs.
2. From a software ergonomics perspective, the ergono-
mist is trained to participate in the design of user
interfaces, to conduct task analyses on the proposed
logical operation of the product, and to participate
in the design of training, operation, and maintenance
materials.
3. From an environmental ergonomics perspective, the
ergonomist can assist the design team in assessing
how known workspace environmental modalities
can impact the use and reliability of the proposed
design (e.g., eﬀects of temperature, humidity, lighting,
ambient noise, and air quality on user fatigue, percep-
tual, and cognitive abilities).
4. From a macro-ergonomics perspective, some ergono-
mists can assist the organization in harmonizing the
design of the product with the way the purchaser
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product development organization, these same ergon-
omists can be called upon to help harmonize their
own organization with the product development pro-
cess, with the manufacturing process, with the prod-
uct distribution process, and/or with the product
ﬁeld support process.
The next step in the SE lifecycle process is product
implementation; this includes iterative preproduction
development of the product (in increasingly more re-
ﬁned form) and mass production or distribution of the
product. The ergonomist can add signiﬁcant value to
both of these processes. In the pre-production stage,
the ergonomist can provide a number of analytic evalu-
ations of the product including heuristic analyses, man-
aging expert reviews, and conducting laboratory-based
usability analyses. As required by the FDA Quality Sys-
tem Regulation [17], test procedures that are appropri-
ate for their intended use (validated test procedures
that possess the appropriate sensitivity, speciﬁcity, and
reliability), properly calibrated equipment, and tests that
are statistically valid must be employed for usability
studies. In the production phase, the ergonomist can as-
sist in job redesign, the development of job aids, as well
as recommendations on environmental and organiza-
tional issues that would enhance the productivity and
job satisfaction of production personnel.
4.3. Compliance engineering
There exist a ‘‘hidden’’ set of changing laws, regula-
tions, and standards (both national and international).
They impose design, testing, implementation, and dis-
posal constraints on the organization. Furthermore,
they vary across industrial sectors and political bound-
aries, thus confounding the successful product develop-
ment process. Compliance engineering involves the
identiﬁcation, applicability assessment, design impact,
test design, and operation/disposal considerations re-
quired to conform to these constraints. Compliance
engineering is an important source of requirements—
constraints being the inverse of requirements.
There exist a large number of ergonomics standards;
they address various aspects of the professions activities
and they are not generally well-known outside the pro-
fession. The ergonomist on the product development
team plays a critical role in identifying, interpreting,
and designing the product (e.g., the health information
system) to conform to these constraints.
4.4. Reliability engineering
Safety (the absence of hazards) is a system property
and but one aspect of reliability. Reliability implies
proper functioning and safety is but one of the require-ments that must be achieved for proper functioning. A
corollary of this is that an unsafe system is an unreliable
system [25].
One normally thinks of reliability engineering in
terms of parts wearing out or undiagnosed software
faults or failures. However, there is another dimension
to the reliability equation—user reliability and use er-
rors. Typically, non-ergonomist designers consider only
the most obvious failure modes or well-known use er-
rors. Ergonomists, by contrast, are trained to use analyt-
ical and laboratory techniques to discover the more
subtle—but potentially more hazardous—use errors.
With these same analytical and laboratory techniques,
putative mitigations can be evaluated and the residual
risks can be properly assessed.
Risk reduction is managed through risk identiﬁca-
tion, risk assessment, risk mitigation, and then re-assess-
ment of residual risks. All members of the design team,
including the ergonomist, utilize standard risk analytic
techniques (e.g., fault tree analysis, failure mode eﬀects
and criticality analysis, or hazard and operability stud-
ies). However, the ergonomist begins not from an anal-
ysis of the mechanical or electronic parts or from an
analysis of the program structure, but rather from a task
and function analysis; the focus is the interface between
the device and the user. Unlike the other members of
the design team, the focus is on:
1. hardware issues (e.g., size, feel, color, and arrange-
ment of physical controls and displays and the impact
on their use with and without surgical gloves),
2. software issues (e.g., mental workload issues, logic of
operations issues, training materials, etc.),
3. environmental issues (e.g., the crisis of a patient in car-
diac arrest, the boredom and reduced vigilance at the
end of a shift, light levels during day and night oper-
ations), and
4. organizational issues (e.g., purchaser organization
administrative procedures for handling/using product
and for scheduling work time, including multiple
shifts, etc.).
At the end of each step in the SE lifecycle, it is essen-
tial to update the hazard analysis! The iterative hazard
analysis plays a crucial role in SE and is a ‘‘gating func-
tion,’’ permitting transition to the next step or looping
back to the previous step. For products and processes
that impact human health and safety, conducting itera-
tive hazard analyses as decisions are made and modiﬁed
throughout the development lifecycle provides an
important mechanism for anticipating latent errors.
Kossiakoﬀ and Sweet [26] emphasize that ‘‘Reducing
program risk is a continual process throughout the life
cycle.’’ Integral risk management activities are crucial
from the FDAs perspective [27]. This is reiterated in
ISO standard 14971:2000 [28]. From an ergonomics
Fig. 6. Mantei and Teorei [30].
Fig. 7. Nielsen [31].
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‘‘needs’’ to ‘‘requirements’’ include such items as
whether all the requisite user populations have been
properly identiﬁed and whether needs elicitation is sta-
tistically valid, so that it can be relied upon to properly
represent the user populations. Ergonomically oriented
hazards associated with the transition from ‘‘require-
ments’’ to ‘‘speciﬁcations’’ include such items as whether
physical size constraints (based upon gender, national-
ity, etc.) are being adequately translated into mechanical
engineering speciﬁcations. The proper formulation of
use risk items, just as the proper formulation of require-
ments and engineering speciﬁcations, is a context-depen-
dent process that is the domain of trained ergonomists.
The proper formulation of use risks involves continual
and intimate involvement of the ergonomist with the
rest of the product design team.
4.5. Comparison with recent models
A number of lifecycle models have been published
over the past two decades, with an emphasis on informa-
tion systems and user interfaces. They do not comprise a
comprehensive list of models and anything not explicitly
stated in the published model was assumed to be absent
for the purposes of this analysis. Each published model
has been recast in the SE lifecycle framework (see Fig.
2); missing elements have been grayed out (Figs. 5–10).
Gould and Lewis [29] emphasize iterative design with
careful study of users and empirical measurements.
Mantei and Teorey [30] closely follow the classical mod-
el, but omit the incremental hazard analyses, do not
identify the testing process involved in veriﬁcation of
the design speciﬁcations and the CAPA process. Nielsen
[31] also emphasizes iterative design and empirical test-
ing cycles, careful study of the user and establishment
of usability goals (requirements). Kreitzberg [32], May-Fig. 5. Gould and Lewis [29]. Fig. 8. Kreitzberg [32].
Fig. 9. Mayhew [33].
Fig. 10. Endsley [34].
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signs, emphasis on the user, and product veriﬁcation.
We determine by inspection that these are all partial
models of the classical systems engineering method.
We were unable to ﬁnd, in any of the published models,
a justiﬁcation (cost, schedule, or management) or beneﬁt
for eliminating the ‘‘grayed out’’ elements of the classi-
cal process. The absence of iterative risk analysis may
be simply because these authors consider it part of the
management process, rather than the development pro-
cess. Nevertheless, iterative risk analysis is an essential
part of reliability engineering and, as mentioned in the
prior section, should be implemented at each stage in
the development process.5. Applications
Since 1964, the National Society of Professional
Engineers, through its adoption of its Code of Ethics
that ‘‘holds paramount the safety, health, and welfare
of the public,’’ has emphasized the consideration of
safety, health, and welfare of humans involved with
engineered systems [35]. SE provides a structured, sys-
tematic approach to risk reduction that is more cost-ef-
fective than ad hoc methods and maximizes the
likelihood that design eﬀorts will yield safe and eﬀective
products or processes. In considering how a SE ap-
proach can be applied to ergonomic problems in the de-
sign and development of health information systems, a
number of practical matters become apparent. Issues
that typically arise include the readiness of the organiza-
tion to embrace a SE approach, the degree of formaliza-
tion that is appropriate for a given project, what metrics
one should use to characterize the human factors chal-
lenges that are inherent in a given system, and what soft-
ware tools can be adopted to facilitate the SE
engineering process.
As implied earlier, some health information systems
are embedded in products that are presently regulated
by the FDA as medical devices. As health information
systems begin to have more profound eﬀects on individ-
ual patient care (e.g., see the recommendations of the
Institute of Medicine, [4,7]), the FDA may also begin
to consider them as medical devices. It is likely that as
networked database systems are shown to have patient
safety implications (e.g., blood bank systems are treated
in this manner at present), they will become subject to
such regulatory processes. For the developers of such
systems, there will be little choice as to whether to imple-
ment an SE process. It will be mandated by the inculca-
tion of SE in the FDAs Quality System Regulation [17].
Another important consideration for health system
information providers, of course, is the cost of imple-
menting this SE process. But a complete and correct
economic analysis requires that these costs of implemen-
tation must also be viewed in the context of the potential
cost of NOT following a systematic SE approach, i.e.,
the costs to the organization if something goes wrong
in the production, use, or disposal of the system. One
need not look far for dramatic examples of what can
go wrong when systems are developed and ﬁelded with-
out an eye towards systems engineering, and particularly
hazard analysis [5,36].
5.1. Some accident scenarios and how they could have
been avoided
Often the conditions that lead to a system failure that
is attributed to human error can be traced to designs
that did not take account of the full range of operating
conditions, did not adequately consider human cogni-
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tent to which communications among teammates might
breakdown under stress, or did not provide appropriate
feedback to the individuals or organizations involved.
By following a SE approach throughout the product
development lifecycle, such oversights can be minimized
or avoided.
5.2. Over-exposure to radiation therapy: an older incident
In the chapter, ‘‘Set Phasers on Stun,’’ Casey de-
scribes the 1986 case of a patient who was accidentally
exposed to a massive, and ultimately lethal, dose of radi-
ation during treatment for a tumor on his shoulder [36].
The technician using the radiation therapy machine
incorrectly typed an ‘‘X,’’ calling for the maximum
power, ‘‘X-ray’’ mode, realized her mistake, and quickly
corrected it by typing an ‘‘up arrow’’ and ‘‘e,’’ for ‘‘elec-
tron beam’’ mode. Unfortunately, this sequence of key-
strokes occurred more quickly than the designers of the
device had anticipated, leaving the device in the ‘‘X-ray’’
mode, despite the fact that the display indicated that it
had been switched to ‘‘electron beam’’ mode. When
the beam was subsequently activated, the patient re-
ceived a dose of radiation that was 125 times the pre-
scribed dose. To make matters worse, the radiation
therapy device then reverted to a ‘‘malfunction’’ mode
which displayed a message to the technician suggesting
that no radiation had been delivered. She then re-acti-
vated the machine twice, repeating the overdose.
Obviously, the design process for the radiation ther-
apy device that led to this patients death was ﬂawed.
It did not take into account the capability of the techni-
cian to enter the sequence of keystrokes to change
modes as quickly as she did. It apparently did not antic-
ipate the likelihood that technicians would need to exe-
cute this sequence of keystrokes, despite the fact that it
seemingly represented a typical cognitive self-correction.
Moreover, the machine reverted to an error mode that
presented a misleading message, which the technician
interpreted as indicating that no radiation had yet been
delivered.
These ﬂaws could have been avoided at several junc-
tures in a systematic VE process. In the Needs Assess-
ment and Requirements setting process, the likelihood
of the technician detecting a mental lapse and correct-
ing herself should have been anticipated. Likewise, the
speed with which human operators, having such intent,
could enter the keystrokes to change modes should also
have been taken into account in designing the mechan-
ics and messaging built into the machine. The failure to
design for this sequence of keystrokes should have been
picked up during hazard analyses that explored the ex-
tent to which requirements had been translated into
speciﬁcations or the extent to which speciﬁcations
had been successfully implemented. Such hazard analy-ses should also have pointed out the potentially disas-
trous eﬀects of the error message that prompted the
technician to reactivate the device and repeat the
overdose.
5.3. Over-exposure to radiation therapy: a more recent
incident
In a 2001 incident, which occurred in an oncology
treatment center in Panama, 28 patients were overex-
posed during radiological therapy and 5 died. The
investigation [37] concluded that the problem arose
in the misuse of a treatment planning system. The sys-
tem required that user enter data on the spatial co-or-
dinates of shielding blocks used to protect healthy
tissue during radiotherapy and that these shielding
blocks be entered into the system one block at a time,
following a certain sequence and subject to a limita-
tion on the number of blocks (four or fewer). One
of the radiation oncologists decided to add a ﬁfth
block, and the physicist in charge devised a new meth-
od to overcome the four block limitation. Instead of
digitizing the blocks individually, i.e., one block at a
time, the staﬀ members entered the contours as one
complex block, with a ﬁrst loop following the inner
boundaries of the block, then with a second loop fol-
lowing their outer boundaries. This method of using
the treatment planning software was neither recom-
mended nor forbidden by the system documentation.
Moreover, the display presented to the user suggested
that the shielding contours had been implemented as
intended. However, the underlying algorithms (it was
later determined) were dependent on the direction in
which the user drew the contours. If the second outer
loop was drawn in the opposite direction to the inner
one, the computer calculated a correct treatment time.
But if the outer loop was drawn in the same direction
as the inner one, the computer accepted the data, but
calculated a wrong treatment time, doubling the dose
to the patient. Retrospective investigations conﬁrmed
that the staﬀ member had performed the latter proce-
dure, that this use of the system was inappropriate,
but that the system documentation was confusing
and incomplete, the display was misleading, and the
algorithm should have been more robust.
This unfortunate incident emphasizes that unforeseen
usage patterns in health software can be lethal and again
highlights the need for systematic hazard analysis. Sys-
tem software should prevent the misinformed, but
well-intentioned user, from creating calculations that
could deliver inappropriate and unintended outputs.
Displays should accurately reﬂect the input conditions,
and to the extent possible, provide insight into the
underlying algorithms being invoked. System documen-
tation should be complete, accurate, and readily usable.
While it may not be possible to foresee all such inappro-
Fig. 11. Degree of formalization.
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to protect against such misapplications. Task analyses
and user involvement in the formative design process
should reveal design pitfalls. User testing, of both the
software and documentation, under realistic operational
conditions should highlight possible misconceptions.
Hazard analyses should catch and allow correction of
any previously unforeseen design shortfalls.
5.4. Implementing SE to avoid such problems
5.4.1. Organizational maturity
Diﬀerent organizations can be viewed as being at dif-
ferent levels of maturity regarding the implementation
of SE—inactive (i.e., not conducting SE approaches to
speak of), reactive, interactive, and proactive. Regulated
industries, such as the medical device industry, are re-
quired by the FDA to be proactive in implementing
these approaches. Depending on the type of product,
there may be various stakeholders whose needs should
be addressed in the engineering process—ergonomists
often focus, as well they should, on the needs of the
users (patients, clinicians, and operators), but one some-
times also needs to take account of the ergonomic issues
related to the role of product managers, designers and
developers, producers/assemblers, maintainers, and dis-
posers (Fig. 3). There are often overlapping interests
among these various constituencies, but on occasion
trade-oﬀs and compromises must be made. A systematic
SE approach should be explicit in exploring the cost-
beneﬁt implications of any such trade-oﬀs and in docu-
menting the choices made.
5.4.2. Degree of formalization that is appropriate
The degree of formalization involved in such project
documentation, and the methods and tools adopted to
facilitate the process, can be tailored to the criticality
and complexity of the system with which one is dealing.
There is no need to produce sophisticated test proce-
dures and electronic databases of test results, when the
level of detail in the requirements, speciﬁcations, hazard
analyses, and test results are such that they could be
handled by checklists or spreadsheets. However, when
criticality is high (e.g., patient safety is at stake or there
may be toxic impacts on the environment) and/or com-
plexity is high (e.g., as dictated by project size, time con-
straints, or project team distribution), then a higher
degree of formalization, and more sophisticated tools
to facilitate the process, are in order. The formalization
positioning diagram, illustrated in Fig. 11, attempts to
convey this relationship. Minimum formalization may
entail only paper or electronic checklists, spreadsheets,
or ﬂow charts. Moderate degrees of formalization may
entail databases of requirements, test methods and
parameters, test results, traceability matrices, and/or
attribute matrices. Maximum formalization eﬀorts, gi-ven the high degree of criticality and complexity in-
volved in the system under scrutiny, almost surely
require software engineering tools to manage and track
the SE process and test results.
5.4.3. Measurement for SE
One overriding principle in the application of SE is
the need to be as quantitative as possible. In considering
ergonomic issues, one might think that we are hampered
by the inherent unreliability of measurements that char-
acterize the human element in system performance.
However, a convincing case can be made for the fact
that measurement issues in ergonomics are not so diﬀer-
ent from the measurement issues in physical systems, by
which hardware and software SE is conducted. The
range and degree of precision may be diﬀerent, but the
basic principles of measurement still hold. There are
many measures by which users and user behavior can
be characterized:
 Behavioral/Performance indices
 Accuracy (e.g., success rate; detection rate; and track-
ing deviations)
 Incidence of error types (omission, commission, etc.)
 Time on task; response time
 Ratings of subjective dimensions (e.g., user satisfac-
tion, workload, stress, and fatigue)
 Anthropometric indices (e.g., height, weight, and
length)
 Biomechanical indices (e.g., force, pressure, and
angular velocity)
 Physiological indices (e.g., heart rate, pupil dilation,
and eye blink frequency).
Measures such as these can help cast ergonomic prob-
lems, and possible interventions, in a SE framework.
One cannot manage what one cannot control. One can-
not control what one cannot measure. One cannot mea-
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not deﬁne what one does not know about. A SE frame-
work will help deﬁne and track the design issues that
need to be considered. In so doing, it encourages mea-
surement of design parameters and human performance
with the system and ultimately controls the risk that is
entailed in system use.
5.5. Available tools that can be adapted for SE
Fortunately, there are now a wide variety of software
tools that are available to help manage the practical
implementation of a SE process. Available tools that
can be adapted for ergonomic SE eﬀorts can be catego-
rized as follows:
 Hazard analysis tools
 Requirements engineering tools
 Compliance engineering tools
 Reliability engineering tools
 CAPA Tools.
5.6. Hazard analysis and tools
Key to the SE process is the management of use-re-
lated hazards and the consequent delineation of system
requirements. Use-related hazards may stem from any
of the following aspects of a system:
 Used in unanticipated ways
 Used in anticipated ways, but inadequately controlled
for
 Requires physical, perceptual, or cognitive abilities
that exceed those of particular users
 Inconsistent with user expectations or intuitions
 Environment aﬀects operation and eﬀect is not recog-
nized or understood by the user
 Users physical, perceptual, or cognitive capacities are
exceeded, when in a particular environment.
Some hazard analysis tools that can be adapted for use
in characterizing ergonomic hazards are the following:
 Dyadem International, Ltd. Tools:
– FMEA www.dyadem.com/products/fmea/index.htm
– HazOp www.dyadem.com/products/pha-pro/index.
htm
 Relex Software:
– FMEA www.relexsoftware.com/products/fmeafmeca.
asp
– FTA www.relexsoftware.com/products/faulttree.
asp.
Too often, only single point failures are considered.
Of critical importance in the hazard analysis is the con-sideration of ‘‘multi-point’’ failures that will interact to
‘‘defeat, bypass, or disable our safety devices’’ [38]. Per-
row points out that such so-called ‘‘system errors’’ may
be reduced by reducing system complexity and coupling
[38]. A similar warning is put forth by Reason [39], who
states that ‘‘it leaves systems prey to the one hazard for
which there is no technological remedy: the insidious
concatenation of latent human failures that are an inev-
itable part of any large organization.’’ Only by a care-
fully managed, structured, systematic human-centered
systems engineering approach can we decrease the com-
plexity of system behavior and identify many (though
clearly not all) latent errors.
5.7. Requirements engineering and tools
Requirements engineering, in the context of ergo-
nomics, involves determining human needs (both those
of the patient and those of the system user, who might
be a caregiver, a technician, or for that matter the pa-
tient himself), deciding which needs will be addressed,
documenting the desired external behavior of the system
(i.e., identifying features and associated requirements),
quantifying these requirements, verifying (i.e., testing)
these requirements, and eventually updating the require-
ments for the next iteration of design.
Well-formed requirements have the following char-
acteristics—they lack ambiguity, are complete, are con-
sistent, can be traced to their origins, are not tied to
speciﬁc design solutions, are veriﬁable and testable,
can be enumerated and categorized, and have attri-
butes that can be identiﬁed and assigned. A systematic
requirements engineering process, as it applies to the
ergonomics of health information systems, involves
determining user needs, deciding which needs will be
addressed, writing down the desired external behavior
of the system (identifying features and associated
requirements), quantifying those requirements, then
testing and verifying/validating that those requirements
are actually met, and if necessary updating those
requirements for the next iteration of design. There
are many tools available to facilitate the requirements
engineering process. Information about such require-
ments engineering tools is available at the following
sources:
 A Survey of Requirements Engineering Tools
(www.volere.co.uk/tools.htm)
 INCOSE Requirements Engineering Tools Taxon-
omy (www.incose.org) ‘‘Quick Links.’’
5.8. Compliance engineering and tools
As requirements and their resulting speciﬁcations
are veriﬁed, there is the need to document and track
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quite complex as diﬀerent measurement standards
are invoked, perhaps diﬀerent licensing requirements
in diﬀerent jurisdictions are brought to bear, and the
inspection process and its outcomes are documented.
A set of tools (License 2000, MYLicense, Mcheck)
that are customized for tracking compliance in the
context of government licensing processes are the
following:
 System Automation Corporation tools (www.
systemautomation.com/products.htm).
5.9. Reliability engineering and tools
There are many aspects in which a system can fail.
The loci of failures can be at the level of the hardware,
the software, the human operator, or at the system le-
vel (i.e., involving the interactions among these various
levels). In attempting to quantify system reliability,
there may often be both a prospective and a retrospec-
tive aspect to be considered. One might sample system
performance based on an operators usage of a proto-
type in an attempt to characterize the probability or
risk of failure. One might also document the perfor-
mance of previous versions of a system in order to
determine, in practice, how a system or several of its
components functioned historically. Assessing the reli-
ability of human performance may seem to be a daunt-
ing task, fraught with unreliability in the measurement
process itself; however, the metrics alluded to above
can be applied with the same principles and data col-
lection formalizations as those applied to physical as-
pects of a system.
The feedback loops in the SE process involve veri-
fying that the system as designed, and eventually as
built and deployed, meets the requirements and speci-
ﬁcations that have been deﬁned for it. This involves
testing and measurement, and as applied to ergonomic
issues, this implies the need to observe system use in a
realistic context of care. A variety of methods can be
brought to bear here, but they have in common a reli-
ance on collecting data from representative users as
they make use of a prototype system under realistic
conditions. Several of the software tools that have
been developed to facilitate the characterization of
system reliability, and which can be adapted for mea-
suring the eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency of human perfor-
mance in operating complex systems, are the
following:
 Relex Software Corp. Tool Suite (www.relexsoftware.
com/products/index.asp)
 ReliaSofts Reliability Growth Analysis Tool (http://
rg.reliasoft.com/) Item Software, Inc. Tool Kit (www.itemsoft.com/
itoolkit.html).
5.10. CAPA tools
Even after the deployment of any complex system,
ﬂaws will be found. There need to be systematic ways
of capturing and correcting these ﬂaws and preventing
their recurrence. An important feedback loop in the
SE process involves Corrective and Preventative Actions
(CAPA). CAPA pertain to the next iteration of product
design and development. There are several software
tools that have been developed to facilitate the CAPA
stage of the engineering process:
 Relsys, Inc. EasyTrak (www.relsys-inc.com/prod-
ucts/easy_trak/overview.asp)
 Pilgrim Software, Inc. SmartCAPA (www.pilgrim-
software. com)
 ReliaSofts FRACAS++ (www.reliasoft.com/enter-
prise/fracas.htm).
5.11. Cost justiﬁcation
SE processes incorporating human factors knowledge
and expertise will be seen as valuable to the extent that
they save money for organizations. While many engi-
neering processes in the biomedical and healthcare are-
nas are driven by licensing and regulatory demands,
and fear of litigation, there can also be other means
for justifying the costs of ergonomics in a SE frame-
work. Growing data suggest that the application of hu-
man factors knowledge have the eﬀect of decreasing
development time and costs, increasing productivity
and eﬃciency, decreasing the cost of operations, and
increasing sales and revenues [40]. The beneﬁt of using
a structured, systematic approach is well-known in the
systems engineering arena (e.g., [18] and [41]). Decreases
in development costs result from fewer design changes
late in the development process. Fewer retroﬁts after
product release, just-in-time supply of parts and ser-
vices, and focusing and coordinating the eﬀorts of the
design team also increase proﬁt margins. Decreases in
the cost of operations stem from fewer catastrophic fail-
ures, increased productivity, decreased need for training,
and decreased costs with timely maintenance and sup-
port. These have been well-recognized in the systems
engineering arena for decades.6. Macroergonomics
While it may be clear from the foregoing that ergono-
mists can make valuable contributions to advancing the
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the development of products and processes, their full
participation as equal partners in the endeavor is often
thwarted by organizational issues. Often, the fundamen-
tal impediment to serious and detailed consideration of
human issues, during product or process development
and deployment, is organizational design—the historical
structures and functions by which the organization has
previously succeeded, or at least, survived. There is a nat-
ural human reluctance (often termed bureaucratic iner-
tia) to modifying what has worked in the past—even if
it has not worked well. And yet this is one of the principal
domains of ergonomics. How does one approach the req-
uisite organizational change? We believe that a logical
approach is to employ essentially the same SEmodel pre-
viously described for microergonomic involvement in the
development of products and process! It is, after all, a
general problem-solving method that is not domain spe-
ciﬁc. Here, though, instead of developing new physical
products or production processes, we will be developing
new work structures and processes (Fig. 12).
The organizational design activities required by SE
elucidate clearly the ‘‘steps usually carried out in an
over-lapping, iterative, and non-linear manner’’ to de-
sign an organizations work system structures and pro-
cesses [42]. The adoption of the SE process helps avoid
the standard pitfalls of organizational design, which
Hendrick [42] identiﬁes as (a) human interface design
for already designed systems; (b) the non-human-cen-
tered or the ‘‘left-over’’ design approach; and (c) failure
to consider and integrate the organizations socio-tech-
nical characteristics into the design of the work struc-
tures and processes.
Only the ‘‘range of disciplines’’ of the SE space will be
transformed for a macroergonomic endeavor—from the
microergonomic [hardware–software–ergonomics–seller/
purchaser economics] to the macroergonomic [manage-
ment–operations–personnel–ﬁnance]. This new range of
disciplines reﬂects the elements essential for organiza-Fig. 12. Macroergonomic SE space.tional change. The domain (requirements, compliance,
and reliability) remains the same, as does the fundamen-
tal time horizon.
From a lifecycle perspective, we begin with the deter-
mination and analysis of the organizations needs and
wants (i.e., its objectives and goals for the work system).
This puts the consideration of ergonomic criteria as
early as possible [43]. We transform these into appropri-
ate requirements and verify that the requirements (and
constraints) conform to the organizational needs and
wants that have been speciﬁcally selected for
implementation.
These requirements are translated into organizational
design speciﬁcations (managerial, operational, human
resource, and ﬁnancial speciﬁcations—remember it costs
money to have additional people ‘‘sitting at the table’’).
Once these speciﬁcations have been veriﬁed against the
requirements, the iterative process of implementing the
requisite work structures and processes begins. Carayon
[43] highlights the issue of work implementation in a
high-pace, high-pressure environment. It is crucial to
recognize that implementation of new or revised work
structures must carefully consider the criticality and
complexity of the processes. The requisite degree of for-
malization is, once again, depicted by Fig. 11. Once the
implementation is veriﬁed against the speciﬁcations and
validated against the requirements, the new work struc-
tures and processes are released. Post-deployment
CAPA studies, in terms of managerial, operational, per-
sonnel, and ﬁnancial issues, drive the next organiza-
tional design iteration. The timescale and approach are
fundamentally the same as for development of any other
system. Salvage and disposal of particular processes and
work breakdown structures, as the needs of the organi-
zation change, are no diﬀerent conceptually than salvage
or disposal of tangible assets.
Not all organizational structures are directly suscep-
tible to this approach. For example, spontaneously
self-organizing teams and ad-hoc project teams coalesce
so rapidly that we can have little control over their
ephemeral development. However, we do have control
over the environment in which they arise (specifying
their expected external behavior and any constraints im-
posed upon them) and the structured, systematic devel-
opment of that working environment is a fundamental
responsibility of management.
As with microergonomic applications, applying the
SE method to organizational issues has the profound
beneﬁt of making the detailed decision-making pro-
cesses structured, systematic, and transparent.7. Conclusions
The SE paradigm is a ‘‘cradle-to-grave,’’ structured,
systematic approach to system risk reduction in product
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of requirements engineering, compliance engineering,
and reliability engineering; it applies to the microergo-
nomic range of hardware engineering, software engi-
neering, human factors engineering, and seller/
purchaser economics. Furthermore, the SE paradigm
can be applied to macroergonomic endeavors, when it
is appropriate to eﬀect organizational change.
The SE method clearly elucidates the important role
that ergonomics should play in product or process
development. It provides a framework of incorporating
human factors engineering knowledge. It clariﬁes for
project managers the complementary roles of hardware,
software, and human factors engineers. Finally, it justi-
ﬁes the continual involvement of ergonomists through-
out the project lifecycle—rather than just at the
beginning or end of the project!
Based upon a graphical analysis, we observe that var-
ious recently published lifecycle models may be viewed
as subsets of the classical SE lifecycle model. In the
aggregate, these models contain essentially all the ele-
ments of the classical model (except for explicit inclusion
of the iterative incremental hazard analyses). While the
failure to consider the full SE model in system develop-
ment eﬀorts is not limited to any particular application
domain, the consequences of doing so may be particu-
larly important in health information systems because
of their safety criticality.
Thus, the health information systems domain can
beneﬁt from the use of the classical systems engineering
method, whose utility has been demonstrated repeatedly
in other arenas over the past half century. Furthermore,
since the SE method described is that detailed by the
FDA (that speciﬁcally requires inclusion of human fac-
tors considerations), it will simplify compliance of
health information systems that may come under the
regulatory purview of the FDA in the future.
Moreover, the ergonomics profession can beneﬁt
from the application of the classical SE approach as well
as contributing to an organizations product/process
development eﬀort utilizing the SE model. The SE
model provides a paradigm for enabling a structured,
systematic human-centered design approach, incorpo-
rating ergonomics knowledge and allowing ergonomists
to contribute throughout the system development
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